In short
- Account emails - password resets, invitations, sign-in alerts - come from the product's own address on its own domain.
- The links in them open a page on the same domain, not a third-party address.
- A backup email service takes over when the main one clearly refuses a message.
- A message that may have been delivered is never sent a second time.
Why the sender matters
People are taught, rightly, to distrust emails that ask them to click a link and type a password. A reset email from a generic address, with a link to an unfamiliar domain, looks exactly like the phishing they were warned about.
Mailbox providers agree. Google and Yahoo now expect bulk senders to authenticate their mail with SPF, DKIM and DMARC, and messages that fail these checks are more likely to be filtered. An email that comes from the product's own domain, authenticated by that domain, is both easier to trust and more likely to arrive.
How Moirova sends account emails
- Password resets, invitations, two-step sign-in confirmations and security alerts come from Moirova's own address, with Moirova's name on them.
- The reset and confirmation links open a page on our own domain, where you choose your new password - not a page hosted at someone else's address.
- The sending service is set up and tested in the product by our team, with its own credentials, kept in a secret store rather than the database.
- Each address can only ask for a few resets a day, so nobody can use the reset form to flood an inbox.
These are the platform's own emails. Your workspace's quotes, invoices and client emails go from your own mailbox or your own email service, under your name.
When an email service fails
Every email service has outages and limits. If the only way to reset a password depends on one service, an outage locks people out. So Moirova has a backup service with its own account and its own limits.
- When the main service clearly refuses a message - it answers with an error, rejects the login or is out of quota - the backup sends it at once.
- It works both ways: if the backup is the one failing, the main service carries the message.
- A service that fails several times in a row rests for a few minutes, so messages are not thrown at a service that is down.
- Each service has its own meter and limits, and our team is warned when one reaches 70 percent of its daily allowance.
The rule we never break: no double sends
Some failures are not clear. A connection can drop after the message was handed over, and nobody knows whether it was delivered. Sending it again through the backup would risk two reset links in the same inbox, so Moirova records it as "may have arrived" and does not resend it. The person can ask again in a couple of minutes, and the limits keep that safe.
Nobody gets locked out
If both services are unavailable, the sign-in page offers another way: a plain reset email from the identity service behind our sign-in. It is less polished, but it works, and a locked-out customer is worse than a plain email.
For teams: if a colleague cannot reset their password, an admin can send them a reset from Admin, People. The email names the admin and the workspace, so the person knows it is expected.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC in plain words
Three records in a domain's DNS decide whether mailbox providers believe an email really came from that domain. They are worth understanding, because the same three records decide whether your own invoices arrive.
- SPF lists the servers allowed to send email for the domain. A message from a server that is not on the list looks suspicious.
- DKIM signs each message with a key that only the domain's sending service holds. The matching public key sits in DNS, so any receiver can check that the message was not changed on the way and that the domain stands behind it.
- DMARC tells receivers what to do when SPF or DKIM fails - nothing, put it in spam, or refuse it - and asks them to send reports about what they saw.
Since 2024, Gmail and Yahoo have asked anyone who sends in volume to have all three in place. Our account emails are sent from our own domain through a sending service that has verified it, with SPF and DKIM, so they pass these checks.
Why the link opens on our own domain
A reset email is only half the story. The link inside it is what people are taught to check. A link to an address they have never seen - a generic identity provider, a long cloud address - is exactly what a phishing email would use.
So the links in our account emails open a page on our own domain, where the person chooses a new password or confirms their email. They can see where they are, and the page looks like the product they use every day. Every link carries a single-use code that expires, so an old email cannot be used to change a password later.
What this means for your own workspace's emails
Account emails are ours. Everything your workspace sends - quotes, invoices, replies to clients, campaigns - goes from your own mailbox or your own email service, under your own domain, and never through our account. The same three records decide whether those emails arrive, so Email settings checks your domain's SPF, DKIM and DMARC before you rely on it.
Since November 18, the domain step finds your signature key with any email server, not only with the services it knows. When it cannot tell which key your server uses, it shows the keys it finds in your DNS and you choose yours with one click. The guide Set up your email domain walks through each record.
A checklist for any product that emails your customers
- Does it send its own emails from its own domain, authenticated with SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
- Do the links open on its own domain, with codes that expire?
- Is there a backup when its email service fails, and does it avoid sending the same email twice?
- Are resets limited, so nobody can flood an inbox from the reset form?
- Does it send your business email through your account rather than its own?
Why this matters even if you never forget a password
Invitations and sign-in alerts travel the same road as resets. A new colleague's invitation that lands in spam means a day lost before they can start, and a security alert that nobody sees defeats its purpose. Sending all of them from one trusted domain, with links that open on that domain, keeps the whole path predictable for everyone on your team, from their first invitation to their last sign-in alert.

